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Abstract 
 
 
The Qing Period (1644–1911) has been recognised as one of the most important eras in China’s demographic 
history. However, factors that determined and contributed to the rise in the Qing population have remained 
unclear. Most works so far have only speculated at what might have caused the population to increase so 
significantly during the Qing Period. 
 
This study uses substantial amounts of quantitative evidence to investigate the impact of changes in China’s 
resource base (farmland), farming technology (rice yield level and spread of maize-farming), social welfare 
(disaster relief), peasant wealth (rice prices), cost of living (silver’s purchasing power), as well as exogenous 
shocks (wars and natural disasters) on the Qing population. 
 
Keywords: economic growth, demography, household incomes, market prices, tax burden, proto-welfare, 
sectoral differences 
JEL Codes: E2, J1, N5. 
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Introduction, motivation and data 
 
 It is commonly agreed that pre-modern China’s population experienced two growth 
spurts: one in the tenth to eleventh centuries (Northern Song: 960–1127), and other 
during c. 1700–1830 (Qing: 1644–1911). 1  During the first growth spurt, China’s 
population jumped from about 50 to 120 million before declining; during the second 
population rose dramatically from about 56 to 400 million before again declining.2 Taken 
together, these two growth spurts accounted for only about 10 percent of the total lifespan 
of the Chinese empire (2,132 years, 221 BC–1911). Thus, they were exceptions rather 
than the rule in China’s long-term historiography. 
 During the Song spurt, the annual population growth rate was 1.07 percent; under the 
Qing, it was substantially higher, at 1.50 percent. Not only was the Qing population 
growth rate 40 percent greater than that of the Song, but the growth also proved to be 
more sustainable, decisively changing China’s demographic trajectory for good (Figure 
1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Many scholars have backdated the second spurt c. 1500; e.g. D. H. Perkins, Agricultural Development in China, 
1368–1968 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1969), Appendix A; Mark Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973), pp. 129, 310; Colin McEvedy and Richard Jones (eds), Atlas of World 
Population History (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1978), pp. 166–74. However, this assertion lacks support by any 
historical record or evidence. Although doubts on China’s official statistics have been raised, (see G. W. Skinner, 
‘Sichuan’s Population in the Nineteenth Century’, Late Imperial China, 8/1 (1987), pp. 1–79), there appears to be no 
technical nor institutional reason for the government not to count people correctly. 
2 See Kent Deng, ‘Unveiling China’s True Population Statistics for the Pre-Modern Era with Official Census Data’, 
Population Review 43/2 (2004), Appendix 3. Note that it has been agreed that between the 1860s and 1920s China’s 
annual population growth rate was still 1.4 percent; see J. K. Fairbank and Kwang-ching Liu (eds), Cambridge History 
of China, Late Ch’ing, 1800–1911, Part II (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), pp. 3–4. 
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Figure 1. China’s Demographic Pattern (in Million), 1–1900 AD  
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Source: (1) Official censuses as the base-line: Liang Fangzhong, Zhongguo Lidai Hukou 
Tiandi Tianfu Tongji (Dynastic Data for China’s Households, Cultivated Land and Land 
Taxation) (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Press, 1980), pp. 4–11; adjusted official 
population data are based on Kent Deng, ‘Unveiling China’s True Population Statistics 
for the Pre-Modern Era with Official Census Data’, Population Review 43/2 (2004), pp. 
1–38. (2) Estimates for comparison: J. D. Durand, ‘The Population Statistics of China, 
A.D. 2–1953’. Population Studies, 13 (1960), pp. 209–57; Colin McEvedy and Richard 
Jones (eds), Atlas of World Population History (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1978), 
pp. 166–74; Kang Chao, Man and Land in Chinese History: An Economic Analysis 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), p. 41; Angus Maddison, Chinese Economic 
Performance in the Long Run (Paris: OECD, 1998), p. 267; Jiang Tao, Lishi Yu Renkou – 
Zhongguo Chuantong Renkou Jieguo Yanjiu (History and Demography – China’s 
Traditional Demographic Pattern) (Beijing: People’s Press, 1998), p. 84; Ge Jianxiong, 
Zhongguo Renkou Shi – Qing Shiqi (A Demographic History of China, Vol. 5, the Qing 
Period) (Shanghai: Fudan University Press, 2000), pp. 831–2; Zhao Gang and Chen 
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Zhongyi, Zhongguo Tudi Zhidu Shi (A History of Land Ownership in China) (Beijing: 
New Star Press, 2006), p. 110. 
 
 Many scholars – mainly historical demographers and archivists – have adopted a 
strictly descriptive mode when dealing with such significant fluctuations of the Qing 
population, as if there were no particular need for an explanation.3 Similarly, some have 
taken the Qing population size for granted in so far as to use it as a proxy for the size and 
health of the economy.4 Yet such an approach leads to circular argumentation: a large 
population was fed by a large economy, and a large economy supported a large 
population.  
 Some recent works have tried to turn the problem on its head by looking for evidence 
that would indicate there was a much smaller population increase than previously 
suggested. These studies have argued that the change in the Qing family size was only 
marginal, suggesting that by the mid-eighteenth century, only one extra person had been 
added to an average household.5 If so, the implication is that China’s population may 
have only experienced 20–25 percent net growth overall. Moreover, it has been proposed 
that preventive checks, both ex ante (herbal contraception) and ex post (infanticide), were 
extensively practised at the household level, meaning that the Qing population may have 
been consciously controlled. 6  On its own, however, the preventative argument is 
                                                 
3  J. D. Durand, ‘The Population Statistics of China, A.D. 2–1953’. Population Studies, 13 (1960), pp. 209–57; 
McEvedy and Jones, Atlas of World Population History, pp. 166–74; Liang Fangzhong, Zhongguo Lidai Hukou Tiandi 
Tianfu Tongji (Dynastic Data for China’s Households, Cultivated Land and Land Taxation) (Shanghai: Shanghai 
People’s Press, 1980), pp. 4–11; Jiang Tao, Lishi Yu Renkou – Zhongguo Chuantong Renkou Jieguo Yanjiu (History 
and Demography – China’s Traditional Demographic Pattern) (Beijing: People’s Press, 1998), p. 84; Ge Jianxiong, 
Zhongguo Renkou Shi – Qing Shiqi (A Demographic History of China, Vol. 5, the Qing Period) (Shanghai: Fudan 
University Press, 2000), pp. 831–2. 
4 E.g. Maddison, Chinese Economic Performance, p. 267; Zhao Gang and Chen Zhongyi, Zhongguo Tudi Zhidu Shi (A 
History of Land Ownership in China) (Beijing: New Star Press, 2006), p. 110. 
5 Lee and Wang, One Quarter of Humanity, pp. 34–5, 38. 
6 Feng Wang, James Lee and Cameron Campbell, ‘Marital Fertility Control among the Qing Nobility’, Population 
Studies 49/3 (1995), pp. 383–400; Li Bozhong, ‘Qingdai Qianzhongqi Jiangnan Renkode Disu Zengzhang Jiqi 
Yuanyin’ (‘The Low Population Growth in the Yangzi Delta and its Reason during Early and Mid-Qing Times’), 
Qingshi Yanjiu (Study of Qing History), 2 (1996): 10–19; Li Bozhong, Duoshijiao Kan Jiangnan Jingjishi, 1250–1850 
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incompatible with the weight of evidence indicating that China’s population quadrupled 
over the period. Such preventative checks, therefore, would had to either occurred very 
late in the period, and/or on very small scale, such that their effect was not significant 
enough to impact the overall population growth dynamics. 
 Meanwhile, why and how the remarkable Qing population growth occurred has 
remained open to debate. Implicitly or explicitly, a Malthusian paradigm is often used 
when the doubling of China's territory under the Qing is considered. 7  Intuitively, 
territorial expansion could lead to more resource endowments and then to more 
population growth. However, China’s territorial increases did not automatically warrant a 
larger population. By the Tang Period (618–907), China’s population had remained 
below 60 million, regardless of two major increases in the empire’s territory during the 
Western Han (206 BC – 25 AD) and the Tang. During the Northern Song (960–1127), 
China shrank back to the size under the Qin (221 BC – 207 BC), but its population 
exceeded 100 million, the largest hitherto in China’s history. Under the Mongol 
colonisation, China’s territory expanded to its historical peak, but China’s population 
stagnated at the 50–60 million level. Under the Qing, China’s territory fell to a size 
between that of the Tang and Yuan, but the population rocketed (Figure 2). So, more 
territory can be viewed at best as a necessary but not sufficient condition for China’s 
population increases. 
 
Figure 2. Fluctuations in China’s Territory,* 221 BC – 1911 AD 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Multiple Dimensional View on Economic History of the Jiangnan Region, 1250–1850) (Beijing: Sanlian Books, 2003), 
pp. 137–212. 
7 E.g. J. K. Fairbank and Merle Goldman, China: A New History (Harvard University Press, 2005), pp. 143–62; J. D. 
Spence, The Search for Modern China, third edition (New York: Norton, 2012), chs 2, 4 and 5; G. D. Rawnsley and M. 
T. Rawnsley (eds.), Political Communications in Greater China (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003), pp. 10–38. 
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Source: Based on Tan Qixiang, Jianming Zhongguo Lishi Dituji (Concise Maps of 
Chinese History) (Beijing: China’s Map Press, 1991), pp. 15–18, 39–40, 57–8, 67–8. 
Note: * Here, the Qing (1644–1911) boundaries are used as a template. A = the Qin 
territory (c. 207 BC) and roughly the Northern Song territory (960–1127); A+B = the 
Western Han territory (c. 24 AD); A+B+C = the Tang territory (c. 907); A+B+C+D = the 
Qing territory (c. 1911) and roughly the Yuan territory (1279–1368).  
 
 A fuller understanding is obtained by recognising that institutions played a vital part in 
determining the nature of population growth under different resource constraints. For 
instance, under the Mongol colonisation of China, genocide against the Han Chinese took 
place under a mindset described as, ‘the Chinese are useless to our cause, and should be 
killed off so that their land can be converted to grazing land’.8 Among those Han Chinese 
who survived, millions were enslaved (quding); horses belonging to the Chinese were 
confiscated; vast agrarian areas were enclosed as grazing land; a second crop after the 
summer harvest was forbidden in order to make space for horses; taxation burden 
                                                 
8 Song Lian, Yuan Shi (History of the Yuan Dynasty) (1371), vol. 153: no. 146 ‘Yeluchucai Zhuan’ (‘Biography of 
Yeluchucai’), in Er-shi-wu Shi (Twenty-Five Official Histories) (Shanghai: Shanghai Classics Press, 1986), vol. 9, p. 
7635; see also A. F. Wright and Denis Twitchett (eds), Confucian Personalities (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1962), pp. 19–20, 189–216. 
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multiplied.9 All such policies effectively counteracted any possible resource windfall that 
would allow for more population growth.  
 In sharp contrast to the Mongol policies, the Qing territorial expansion was coupled 
with the government physiocratic commitment. Private land ownership was granted to the 
Han Chinese. Government schemes deliberately proliferated owner-tiller farms into new 
frontiers including Manchuria and South Mongolia. Efforts were also made to open up 
the north-western region of Gansu and Xinjiang and the south-western region of Sichuan, 
Guizhou and Yunnan, also for farming. 10  These schemes left only Tibet and 
neighbouring Qinghai untouched.  
 The supply of farmland under the Qing became without doubt more elastic. The 
additional farmland supply in Manchuria and South Mongolia alone was equivalent to 
about one-sixth of China’s total. China’s farmland more than doubled in the first 100 
years of the Qing rule (Figure 3). Thus, we consider the first factor in relation to the Qing 
population growth to be supply of farmland. The current research examines the impact of 
such a supply on the Qing population.11 
 
Figure 3. Supply of Farmland versus Population Growth, 1650–1900 
                                                 
9 Wang Qi, Xu Wenxian Tongkao (Imperially Commissioned Continuation of the Comprehensive Study of Literature) 
(publisher unknown, 1586), vol. 1; Perkins, Agricultural Development in China, pp. 23–4, 197–9; Zheng Xuemeng, 
Jiang Zhaocheng and Zhang Wenqi, Jianming Zhongguo Jingji Tongshi (A Brief Panorama of Chinese Economic 
History) (Harbin: Heilongjiang People’s Press, 1984), pp. 242–4, 254–5. 
10 By the 1820s, the new farmland in the Balikun and Yili regions of Xinjiang (also known as ‘Chinese Turkistan’) 
alone totalled 908,500 mu or 121,735 hectares; see Chen Hua, Qingdai Quyu Shehui Jingji Yanjiu (Regional Socio-
Economic Conditions during the Qing Period) (Beijing: People’s University Press, 1996), p. 265; J. K. Leonard and J. 
R. Watt (eds.), To Achieve Security and Wealth (Ithaca: Cornell University East Asia Program, 1992), pp. 21–46. 
11 The elastic supply of farmland contradicts the well-circulated notion — known as the ‘man-land ratio argument’ — 
that arable land under the Qing was fixed and thus its workforce had to farm more intensively to keep up with an 
increasing population; see Kang Chao, Man and Land in Chinese History: An Economic Analysis (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1986). 
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Source: Farmland is based on Liang, Dynastic Data, pp. 10, 380, 384, 396, 400, 401. 
Population is based on Deng, ‘Unveiling China’s True Population Statistics’. 
Note: Farmland in mu. Population in persons. 
 
Concomitant with the impact of farmland supply providing support for the Qing 
population growth was labour mobility. During the Qing, the scale of internal migration 
was greater than that of the previous Ming Period (Figure 4). The impetus for such 
increased migration level was the Qing policy of ‘farming by invitation’ (quannong), 
which actively encouraged farmers to occupy newly available farmland, including old 
core farming regions such as Shanxi, Zhejiang, Hunan, Fujian and Guangdong.  
 
Figure 4. Internal Migration Index (1369=100), 1369–1900 
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Source: Ge Jianxiong (ed.), Zhongguo Yimin Shi (A History of Migration in China) 
(Fuzhou: Fujian People’s Press, 1997), vol. 1, pp. 342–40. 
Note: Ordinate – persons. Abscissa – Calendar years. 
 
 The concern behind the Qing migration policy was an explicit economy-wide resource 
re-allocation policy called ‘filling regions with land abundance with population from 
regions of high population density’ (‘yi zhai bu kuan’).12 Often, the Qing state provided 
migrants with free passage, working capital (seed and tools) and tax holidays for a 
number of years. Overall, the policy proved effective (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Internal Economic Migration during the Qing Period 
 
 Donor Region Recipient Region      
 Shanxi Sichuan  
 Hunan Guangdong, Fujian  
 Anhui, Hubei Shanxi  
 Henan, Jiangxi Shanxi  
 Hunan, Guangdong  Sichuan  
 Jiangxi Fujian  
                                                 
12 Anon., Qing Gaozong Shilu (Veritable Records of Emperor Gaozong of the Qing Dynasty) (1799. Reprint. Taipei: 
Hualian Press, 1964), vol. 311, Entry ‘Shisannian Sanyue’. 
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 Fujian, Guangdong Hunan  
 Fujian Zhejiang, Taiwan  
 Shandong Manchuria  
 Shanxi Mongolia  
 
 
Source: Ge Jianxiong (ed.), Zhongguo Yimin Shi (A History of Migration in China) 
(Fuzhou: Fujian People’s Press, 1997), vol. 1, pp. 169–402. 
Note: The actual numbers of migrants are difficult to assess. Often, only vague amounts 
are mentioned in reference to a migration scheme, such as, ‘several tens thousand 
persons/households’, or ‘60 to 70 percent of the locals migrated’. 
 
 Large numbers of migrants from the old core regions (such as Shandong, Shanxi, 
Shaanxi, Hebei, and Henan) resettled elsewhere for a better life.13 By 1668, the frontier 
region of Manchuria had absorbed 14 million immigrants from China proper.14 In the 
nineteenth century, the annual immigrants to that region were 600,000. By the very end 
of the Qing (at 1907), the government immigration quota for Heilongjiang, the northern 
tip of Manchuria, was two million per year.15 Large-scale immigration also took place 
into Mongolia. In 1712, the number of immigrants from Shandong counted for over 
100,000. 16  As a result, modern-day Manchuria, Mongolia and Sichuan are lineage 
enclaves of clans from Shandong, Hebei, Hubei and Hunan.17  
                                                 
13  For the eighteenth century, see Pierre-Etienne Will, Bureaucracy and Famine in Eighteenth-Century China 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990), pt. 2. 
14 Anon., Veritable Records of Emperor Gaozong of the Qing Dynasty, vol. 311, Entry ‘Shisannian Sanyue’ (The 
Third Month of the Thirteenth Year under the Gaozong Reign). 
15 Tian and Chen, Brief History of Migration, pp. 110–12. 
16 The Qing state eventually imposed a ban on permanent immigration to Manchuria (1668–1860) and Mongolia 
(1740–1897). But there was little control over seasonal migrants to both regions. Moreover, by the time when the 
restriction was introduced in 1740–2 , a large number of immigrants had already settled in; see Zhao Erxun, Qingshi 
Gao (Draft of the History of the Qing Dynasty) (1927), vol. 120 ‘Shihuo Zhi’ (Economy), in Twenty-Five Official 
Histories, vol. 11, pp. 9252–9. 
17 Yuan Yida and Zhang Cheng, Zhongguo Xingshi Qunti Yichuan He Renko Fenbu (Chinese Surnames, Group 
Genetics and Demographic Distribution) (Shanghai: East China Normal University Press, 2002), pp. 6–57. 
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 Likewise in Sichuan near the upper reaches of the Yangtze River, a surge of 
immigration began in 1713 under Emperor Kangxi’s edict of ‘filling up Sichuan with the 
population from Hubei’ (huguang tian sichuan).18 In 1743–8 alone, a quarter of a million 
migrants re-settled there.19  Minor waves of migration also occurred elsewhere.20  
 Such vigorous economic-driven migration and farming resettlement significantly 
altered China’s resource allocation regarding labour, capital and land. However, the 
actual impact of this economic migration on Qing population growth has thus far 
remained unclear. This study regards internal migration as inherently related to the 
increase in farmland. In other words, new gains in farmland became an effective factor in 
the economy only because new immigrants settled and farmed the new land. We thus 
consider internal migration attached to the factor of farmland. 
 The second factor we find central to explaining Qing population dynamics is food 
production. Some scholars see the Qing population growth as subject to technological 
determinism. Mark Elvin’s heuristic ‘High Level Equilibrium Trap’ hypothesises a 
mutually-reinforcing mechanism between labour-intensive agriculture and population 
density until the Qing economy reached equilibrium. Under his argument, China’s 
technology was fixed indefinitely and only imported new technology could unlock 
China’s equilibrium. 21 Elvin’s approach has been modified by Francesca Bray who, 
inspired by Ester Boserup,22 argued specifically that rice-farming was the determinant for 
China’s (as well as the whole of Monsoon Asia’s) demographic pattern. She presented a 
notion that rice production suffers little diminishing returns and hence eliminates the 
                                                 
18 Tian Fang and Chen Yijun, Zhongguo Yimin Shilue (Brief History of Migration in China) (Beijing: Knowledge 
Press, 1986), pp. 113–14; Chen, Regional Socio-Economic Conditions, ch. 8; Jiang Tao, Renko Yu Lishi, Zhongguo 
Chuantong Renko Jiego Yanjiu (Population and History, A Study of Chinese Traditional Demographic Structure) 
(Beijing: People’s Press, 1998), p. 96. 
19 Anon., Veritable Records of Emperor Gaozong of the Qing Dynasty, vol. 311, Entry ‘Shisannian Sanyue’ (The 
Third Month of the Thirteenth Year under the Gaozong Reign). 
20 James Lee, ‘Population Growth in Southwest China, 1250–1850’, The Journal of Asian Studies, 41/4 (1982), pp. 
711–46. 
21 Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past, ch. 9. 
22 Ester Boserup, The Conditions of Agricultural Growth: The Economies of Agrarian Change under Population 
Pressure (London: Allen and Unwin, 1965). 
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ceiling for population growth.23 In other words, under rice farming, population growth 
becomes unlimited. Evidence suggests, however, that the average wheat yield level 
remained largely unchanged while the average rice yield level increased but modestly 
(Figure 5). This suggests that the Qing crop yield levels remained very stable over time.24 
 
Figure 5. Crop Yield Levels, 1640–1910 
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Source: Shi Zhihong, ‘Shijiu Shiji Shangbanqide Zhongguo Liangshi Muchanliang Ji 
Zongchanliang Zai Guji’ (Re-Estimation of Yields per Mu and the Aggregate Food 
Output in Early Nineteenth Century China), Zhongguo Jingjishi Yanjiu (Research into 
Chinese Economic History) 3 (2012), pp. 52–66. 
Note: Rice and wheat crops only. (1) Average rice yields from 12 southern provinces 
(Anhui, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Sichuan, 
Guizhou, Yunnan), (2) average wheat yields from 8 northern provinces (Zhili, Shandong, 
Shanxi, Henan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Manchuria, Xinjiang), counting one crop only. 
 
 Similarly, Kang Chao has argued that, with China’s arable land being fixed, the Qing 
peasantry had to farm more, and more intensively, to increase food provision. 25 
However, the reality was that in Shandong, Jiangnan, Fujian and Guangdong — places 
                                                 
23 Bray, The Rice Economies. 
24 According to Wu Hui, there was mere a 1.7 percent increase in China’s crop yield level from the Ming to the Qing; 
see Wu Hui, Zhongguo Jingjishi Rugan Wentide Jiliang Yanjiu (Quantitative Studies of Chinese Economic History) 
(Fuzhou: Fujian People’s Press, 2009), p. 147. 
25 Chao, Man and Land in Chinese History, ch. 1. 
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where food shortage perpetuated during the Qing — local farmers did not necessarily 
farm more intensively and with more varieties for staple food.26 Instead, they often grew 
more cash crops, especially cotton, tea and, later tobacco, in exchange for rice imported 
from food-surplus regions.27 This was rural ‘involution’ in full swing.28 There were as 
many as ten shipping routes running from rice-surplus provinces to cash crop producing 
provinces, transporting as much as 36–57 million piculs (shi) of rice per annum.29 Since 
one picul contained 75 kilograms, this makes the total shipment 2.7–4.3 million tonnes. 
Given it takes 180 kilograms of cereal to maintain an adult at the subsistence level, 
approximately 15–24 million adults were able to live entirely on imported rice in the four 
food-deficit provinces. 
 Other scholars see new crop species from outside the empire as a driver of the Qing 
population growth. These were the ‘New World crops’ – maize (Zea mays), white 
potatoes (Solanum tuberosum) and sweet potatoes (Ipomoea batatas). 30  Anecdotal 
                                                 
26 Contemporary scholars such as Li Bozhong and Pomeranz mention little about the New World crops in the Ming–
Qing Jiangnan region. See Li Bozhong, Duoshijiao Kan Jiangnan Jingjishi, 1250–1850 (Multiple Dimensional View on 
Economic History of the Jiangnan Region, 1250–1850) (Beijing: Sanlian Books, 2003); Kenneth Pomeranz, The Great 
Divergence, Europe, China and the Making of the Modern World Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
2000). 
27 Chen Hua, Qingdai Quyu Shehui Jingji Yanjiu (Regional Socio-Economic Conditions during the Qing Period) 
(Beijing: People’s University Press, 1996), pp. 106–7; K. L. So, Prosperity, Region, and Institutions in Maritime China, 
the Fukien Pattern, 946–1368 (Cambridge [MA]: Harvard University Asia Center, 2000), pp. 95–6. 
28 Philip Huang, The Peasant Economy and Social Change in North China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985); 
Chen Chunsheng and Liu Zhiwei, ‘Qingdai Jingji Yunzuode Liangge Tedian’ (Two Characteristics of Qing Economic 
Operation), Zhongguo Jingjishi Yanjiu (Research into Chinese Economic History), 3 (1990), pp. 84–9.  
29 Wu Chengming, Zhongguode Xiandaihua: Shichang Yu Shehui (China’s Modernisation: the Market and Society) 
(Beijing: Sanlian Books, 2001), pp. 152–7; Zhang Haiying, Mingqing Jiangnan Shangpin Liutong Yu Shichang Tixi 
(Commodity Flows and Market Structure in the Jiangnan Region during the Ming-Qing Period) (Shanghai: East China 
Normal University Press, 2001), pp. 198–203; Wu, Quantitative Studies of Chinese Economic History, p. 376. 
30  These crops were introduced in the following sequence: Sweet potato vines (fanshu, Ipomoea batatas) were 
smuggled to China from Luzon in 1593. Maize (yumi, Zea mays) was first mentioned in Li Shizhen’s Compendium of 
Materia Medica (Bencao Gangmu) written in 1578 (Reprint. Beijing: People’s Press, 1977), vol. 23; and then in Xu 
Guangqi’s Nongzheng Quanshu (Complete Treatise on Agricultural Administration of 1628 (Reprint. Shanghai: 
Shanghai Classics Press, 1979), p. 629. The white potato (malingshu, Solanum tuberosum) was first introduced to 
Taiwan around 1650. See Guo Wentao, Zhongguo Nongyie Keji Fazhan Shilue (A Brief History of Development of 
Agricultural Science and Technology in China) (Beijing: Chinese Science and Technology Press, 1988), pp. 383–4. Yet 
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evidence suggests that in the early seventeenth century, sweet potatoes were able to yield 
ten times (gross weight) that of rice;31 similarly, maize allegedly increased the land yield 
by 30 percent.32 A common assumption has thus been made that there was a close link 
between these crops and the fast growth in China’s population. 33  In this study, we 
attempt to clarify the role of the New World crops in regard to the Qing population 
growth. The spread of new crops is our third factor.  
 A complicating issue, however, is that not until the first comprehensive survey of 
China’s agrarian economy in the 1920s34 was the geographic spread of New World crops 
ever systematically mapped. Therefore, due to data availability, we use maize as a 
representative for New World crops. Official records for the spread of sweet potatoes are 
limited to the provincial level (18 provinces under the Qing rule).35 Official records for 
maize are much better: at the county level (over 1,300 counties).36 However, there is no 
                                                                                                                                                 
until the 1630s, their spread was very limited. According to Song Yingxing’s Exploitation of the Works of Nature 
(Tiangong Kaiwu) of 1637, seventy percent of the Chinese lived on rice and thirty percent on wheat, barley, sorghum 
and millet. The New World crops were excluded; see Song Yingxing, Tiangong Kaiwu (Exploitation of the Works of 
Nature) (1637. Reprint. Guangzhou: Guangdong People’s Press, 1976), p. 11. These crops became better known during 
the Qing Period. 
31  Shi Shenghan, Nongzheng Quanshu Jiaozhu (Annotated Edition of the ‘Complete Treatise on Agricultural 
Administration’) (Shanghai: Shanghai Classics Publisher, 1979), p. 692. 
32 See J. K. Fairbank and Kwang-ching Liu (eds), Cambridge History of China, Late Ch’ing, 1800–1911, Part II 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 11. Also see R. H. Myers, The Chinese Peasant Economy: 
Agricultural Development in Hopei and Shangtung, 1890-1949 (Cambridge [MA]: Harvard University Press, 1970), 
Appendix. 
33 E.g. Mark Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973), p. 298; F. W. Mote, 
Imperial China, 900-1800 (Cambridge [MA]: Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 750; L. E. Stover and T. K. Stover, 
China: an Anthropological Perspective (Pacific Palisades [CA]: Goodyear Publishing Co., 1976), p. 115. See also, Lee 
James, ‘Population Growth in Southwest China, 1250–1850’ The Journal of Asian Studies, 41/4 (1982), pp. 711–46; L. 
E. Stover and T. K. Stover, China: an Anthropological Perspective (Pacific Palisades [CA]: Goodyear Publishing Co., 
1976), p. 115. See also, Lee James, ‘Population Growth in Southwest China, 1250–1850’ The Journal of Asian Studies, 
41/4 (1982), pp. 711–46. 
34 J. L. Buck, Land Utilization in China: Atlas (London: Oxford University Press, 1937). 
35 Jia, Ruixue, ‘Weather Shocks, Sweet Potatoes and Peasant Revolts in Historical China’, The Economic Journal, 
124/575 (2014), pp. 92–118. 
36 Xian Jinshan, ‘Cong Fangzhi Jizai Kan Yumi Zai Woguode Yinjin He Chuanbo’ (Adoption and Spread of Maize 
Seen from Local Gazetteers), Gujin Nongye (Agriculture, Past and Present), 1 (1988), pp. 99–111. 
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record on the actual sown area for sweet potato or maize. Thus, we use the geographic 
spread of maize as a proxy for the new farming technology of the time (Figure 6). 
 
Figure 6. Spread of Maize-farming (% of All Counties), 1650–1910  
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Source: Xian Jinshan, ‘Cong Fangzhi Jizai Kan Yumi Zai Woguode Yinjin He Chuanbo’ 
(Adoption and Spread of Maize Seen from Local Gazetteers), Gujin Nongye (Agriculture, 
Past and Present), 1 (1988), pp. 99–111. 
 
 The fourth factor we consider is degree of tax burden imposed on the citizenry. In the 
beginning of the Qing rule, the heavy taxes of the previous Ming Period were abandoned, 
a policy known as ‘abolishment of the Ming practice’ (fei mingfa).37 Until 1840 when 
fiscal crises occurred, the Qing bureaucracy maintained strong distaste for tax 
increases.38 In 1712, the total revenue of the Land-Poll (diding) was frozen for good to 
allow surpluses to be retained by ordinary households.39 As a result, the highest annual 
tax revenue collected in grain under the Qing (as of 1820) was 29 percent of its Ming 
counterpart (as of 1502). The Qing tax burden per unit of land (as of 1661) was 17 
                                                 
37 Zhao, Draft of the History of the Qing Dynasty, vol. 14 ‘Shizuji Yuannian’ (Biography of Emperor Shizu, the First 
Year of His Reign). 
38 W. J. Peterson (ed.), The Cambridge History of China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), vol. 9. pp. 
604–5. 
39 Deng, China’s Political Economy, pp. 16–18. 
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percent of the peak of the Ming (as of 1542).40 The Qing tax burden per capita (as of 
1766) was 8 percent of the Ming (as of 1381).41 Conceptually, a significantly declining 
tax burden would be beneficial to population growth (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 7. Tax Burden  Indices (1660 = 100), 1660–1900  
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Source: Population is based on Deng, ‘Unveiling China’s True Population Statistics’. 
Farmland is based on Liang, Dynastic Data, pp. 396, 400, 401. Taxes are based on Liang, 
Dynastic Data, pp. 10, 380, 384; Xiang Huaicheng, Zhongguo Caizheng Tongshi (A 
General History of Government Finance in China), 2006, vol. 8, pp. 78, 222. 
 
 Exogenous shocks can also impact population levels. During the first 100 years of the 
Qing rule, while the number of natural disasters increased, the total number of all 
disasters (natural and man made) declined (Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8. Qing Disaster Index (1646 = 100), 1646–1910 
                                                 
40 Gang Deng, The Premodern Chinese Economy – Structural Equilibrium and Capitalist Sterility (London and New 
York: Routledge, 1999), p. 124. 
41 Liang, Dynastic Data, p. 428. 
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Source: Chen Gaoyong, Zhongguo Lidai Tianzai Renhuo Biao (Chronological Tables of 
Chinese Natural and Man-made Disasters) (Shanghai: Jinan University Press, 1937). 
 
We consider government spending on disaster relief as the fifth factor. Ever since the 
early Qing, the state provided the population with a safety net against famine (Figure 
9).42 Relief aid during a bad year sometimes exceeded the state annual tax revenue by 
several times.43  
 
Figure 9. Qing Disaster Relief Recipient Index (1646 = 100), 1646–1910 
                                                 
42 Pierre-Etienne Will, Bureaucracy and Famine in Eighteenth-Century China (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1990); Pierre-Etienne Will and R. B. Wong, Nourish the People: the State Civilian Granary System in China, 1650-
1850 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Center for Chinese Studies, 1991); Kent Deng, China’s Political Economy in 
Modern Times (London: Routledge, 2011), pp, 19–24. 
43 W. J. Peterson (ed.), The Cambridge History of China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), vol. 9, pt. 1, 
p. 307. 
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Source: Zhao Erxun, Qingshi Gao (Draft of the History of the Qing Dynasty) (1927), vols 
4–25 ‘Benji’ (Biographies of the Qing Emperors), in Er-shi-wu Shi (Twenty-Five Official 
Histories) (Shanghai: Shanghai Classics Press, 1986), vol. 11, pp. 8827–8937. 
Note: Recipient county as the basic accounting unit. 
 
 Over the course of its reign, the Qing state governed from 1,672 to 1,704 counties.44 As 
indicated in Table 2, therefore, our preliminary observations indicate that the empire was 
covered 29 times by aid schemes. Densely populated core farming zones received more 
aid than the periphery (Table 3). 
 
Table 2. Disaster Relief Coverage, 1674–1911 
 
 Year Tax exemptions* Aid hand-outs* Total (A) *  A/B† index  
1674–1723 3,281 – 3,281 2.0 
1724–73 9,784 6,082 15,866 9.5 
1774–1823 8,850 1,889 10,739 6.4 
1824–73 7,295 3,004 10,299 6.2 
1874–1911 6,278 2,465 8,743 5.2 
Total 35,443 13,440 48,883 29.2 
                                                 
44 Zhao, History of the Qing Dynasty, vols 54–81 ‘Dili Zhi’ (Administrative Geography), in Twenty-Five Official 
Histories, vol. 11, pp. 9071–9131. 
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Annual average 149.5 56.7 206.3  
 
 
Source: Zhao, History of the Qing Dynasty, vols 4–25 ‘Benji’ (Biographies of the Qing 
Emperors), in Twenty-Five Official Histories, vol. 11, pp. 8827–8937. 
Note: * Total recipient counties. † Calculated based on 1,672 counties. 
 
Table 3. Provincial Aggregate Disaster-Aid Entries, 1644–1911 
 
 Provincial entries % in China’s total 
Northern core farming provinces  693 40.7 
Southern core farming provinces  677 39.7 
Northern periphery farming provinces   148 8.7 
Southern periphery farming provinces  170 10.0 
Non-farming provinces   16 0.9 
Total entries   1,704* 
Total shares    100.00 
 
 
Source: Zhao, Draft of the History of the Qing Dynasty, vols 4–25 ‘Benji’ (Biographies 
of the Qing Emperors) and vols 54–81 ‘Dili Zhi’ (Administrative Geography), in Twenty-
Five Official Histories), vol. 11, pp. 8827–8937, 9071–9131.45 
Note: Northern core farming provinces: Zhili, Henan, Shandong, Shanxi, Shaanxi, and 
Gansu. Southern core farming provinces: Anhui, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Hubei, Hunan, 
Jiangxi, Fujian, Guangdong. Northern periphery farming provinces: Fengtian, Jilin, 
Heilongjiang, and Xinjiang. Southern periphery farming provinces: Sichuan, Guizhou, 
Guangxi, Yunnan, and Taiwan. Non-farming provinces: Tibet, Qinghai, Chahar, and 
Mongolia. * Including country-equivalent units. 
  
                                                 
45 Zhao’s history is commonly recognised authoritative for the Qing dynasty, ranked equally with all the official 
histories of the other dynasties. 
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 The cost of living represents the sixth major factor influencing growth of the Qing 
population. Studies by scholars like Pomeranz, Fang Xing, Bozhong Li, Fan Jinmin, and 
Gao Wangling have indicated that until circa 1850 ordinary rural people lived rather well 
in the Qing period.46 We use food prices and currency purchasing power as proxies for 
the cost of living. The most complete records of prices are those from China’s rice 
farming regions, especially the urban market of the Lower Yangtze Valley (Figure 10).  
 
Figure 10. Average Urban Rice Prices in Jiangsu and Zhejiang, 1740–1910 
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Source: Yejian Wang, The Database of Grain Prices in the Qing Dynasty. Institute of 
Modern History, Academia Sinica, 2013, http://140.109.152.38/DBIntro.asp. 
Note: * In amount of silver (taels) per shi of rice. Prices of the Ninth Month when supply 
was plenty. Locations were the seats of governments of the named prefectures. 
 
 Given its use throughout the Qing era as currency, we also construct a silver purchasing 
power index —measured by amount of rice one tael of silver purchased — to gauge the 
                                                 
46  Pomeranz, Kenneth, The Great Divergence, Europe, China and the Making of the Modern World Economy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), ch. 1; Fang Xing, ‘Qingdai Diannongde Zhongnonghua’ (Tenants 
Joining the Middle-Income Group during the Qing Period), Zhongguo Xueshu (Chinese Academics) 2 (2000), pp. 44–
61; Li Bozhong, ‘Rengen Shimu Yu Mingqing Jiangnan Nongminde Jingying Guimo’ (The Practice of ‘Ten Mu per 
Farmer’ and the Scale of the Traditional Peasant Economy), Zhongguo Nongshi (Agricultural History of China), 1 
(1996), pp. 1–14; Fan Jinmin, Guoji Minsheng, Mingqing Shehui Jingji Yanjiu (National Economy and People’s 
Livelihood in the Ming-Qing Period) (Fuzhou: Fujian People’s Press, 2008); Gao Wangling, Zudian Guanxi Xinlun: 
Dizhu, Nongmin He Dizu (New Theory of Tenancy: Landlords, Tenants and Rents) (Shanghai: Shanghai Books, 2005). 
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cost of living (Figure 11). At first glance, the silver purchasing power index seems to 
move in the opposite direction of rice prices. This would suggest that the increase in 
prices of rice might have been dictated more by inflations of the silver currency, as 
opposed to population pressure.  
 
Figure 11. Silver Purchasing Power Index (1646=100),* 1640–1910  
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
16
40
16
60
16
80
17
00
17
20
17
40
17
60
17
80
18
00
18
20
18
40
18
60
18
80
19
00
 
Source: (1) Before 1693, based on Ye Mengzhu, Yueshi Bian (Record of Life-time 
Experience in Songjiang) (c. 1688. Reprint. Shanghai: Shanghai Classics Press, 1981), 
vol.7, pp. 153–4; Yao Tinglin, Linian Ji (Personal Annals) (c. 1698. Reprint. Shanghai: 
Shanghai People’s Press, 1982), pp. 43–156. (2) During 1693–1722, based on 
Department of Archives, Palace Museum (ed.), Li Xu Zouzhe (Li Xu’s Memorials to the 
Throne) (Beijing: Zhonghua Books, 1976), pp. 1–293. (3) During 1723–35, based on H. 
S. Chuan and R. A. Kraus, Mid-Ch’ing Rice Markets and Trade: An Essay in Price 
History (East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 1975), pp. 145–8. (4) After 
1736, based on Wang, The Database of Grain Prices. 
Note: * The index represents the amount of rice one silver tael was able to buy. Data are 
from Jiangsu Province of the Lower Yangtze. 
 
 To isolate silver’s impact on rice prices, we use the terms of trade between cotton cloth 
and rice. The cotton cloth price relative to per unit of rice shows a downward trend 
similar to silver purchasing power index (Figure 12). There exists no evidence indicating 
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any significant technical progress in cotton farming and cotton textile production of the 
time that would drive relative cotton prices lower. 47 Hence, it is apparent that food 
became substantively more expensive during the Qing.  
 
Figure 12. Rice-Cloth Terms of Trade Index (1700=100),* 1700–1910  
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Sources: Huang Miantang, Zhongguo Lidai Wujia Wenti Kaoshu (Study of Prices in 
China’s History over the Long Term) (Jinan: Qilu Books, 2007), pp. 10, 11–12, 47–9, 
52–7, 61–5, 101–7, 109–14, 314, 318–21, 330–3, 336–9 ; Xu Xinwu, Jiangnan Tubu Shi 
(A History of Homemade Cotton Cloth in the Lower Yangzi Delta) (Shanghai: Shanghai 
Academy of Social Science Press, 1989), pp. 176, 201; Yu Yaohua, Zhongguo Jiage Shi 
(A History of Prices in China) (Beijing: China’s Prices Press, 2000), pp. 805, 921–2, 
929.48 
Note: * Amount of rice (urban prices) per bolt of cotton cloth was able to buy.   Cloth 
here is measured in three zhang per bolt, a common unit for tax payment and domestic 
trade. Rice means white rice, husked and ready to cook. 
 
  Meanwhile, rice prices and population growth moved at the different rates (Figure 13). 
Case by case, in some locales, relative population growth outstripped increases in rice 
prices (those provinces to the left of Tongzhou), whereas in other provinces rice prices 
                                                 
47 Xu Xinwu, Jiangnan Tubu Shi (A History of Homemade Cotton Cloth in the Lower Yangzi Delta) (Shanghai: 
Shanghai Social Sciences Press, 1989). 
48 For much lower cotton cloth pries, see Xu Xinwu, Jiangnan Tubu Shi (A History of Homemade Cotton Cloth in the 
Lower Yangzi Delta) (Shanghai: Shanghai Academy of Social Science Press, 1989), pp. 92, 94. 
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increased more than population (those to the right of Tongzhou). As such, a more in 
depth analysis is necessary in order to understand the independent impact of cost of living 
on the population. 
 
Figure 13. Index Values for Changes in Local Total Population and Rice Prices, 1775/6 – 
1820, by Prefectures in the Lower Yangtze 
 
Source:  See Table 4. 
 
Table 4. Changes in Local Total Population (Both Rural and Urban) and Rice Prices 
 
Prefecture 1775/6 (A) 1820 (B) Index (B/A x 100) 
A. Jiangsu Province 
1. Changzhou 
 Population* 311.5 389.6 115 
 Rice prices† 1.8 2.1 117 
2. Haizhou 
 23 
 Population* 103.3 122.6 119 
 Rice prices† 1.8 3.2 178 
3. Huai-an 
 Population* 263.0 300.0 114 
 Rice prices† 2.0 2.4 120 
4. Jiangning 
 Population* 394.1 525.2 133 
 Rice prices† 1.9 2.1 111 
5. Songjiang  
 Population* 227.7 263.2 116 
 Rice prices† 1.7 2.0 118  
6. Suzhou 
 Population* 511.1 590.8 116 
 Rice prices† 1.9 2.1 111   
7. Taichang 
 Population* 142.3 177.2 125 
 Rice prices† 2.1 2.5 119 
8. Tongzhou 
 Population* 245.5 280.1 114 
 Rice prices† 2.1 2.4 114 
9. Yangzhou 
 Population* 515.7 666.3 129 
 Rice prices† 2.1 2.1 100 
10. Zhenjiang 
 Population* 177.0 219.5 124 
 Rice prices† 2.0 2.3 115 
B. Zhejiang Province 
11. Hangzhou  
 Population* 268.2 319.7 119 
 Rice prices† 1.8 2.3 128 
12. Huzhou 
 24 
 Population* 215.3 256.8 119 
 Rice prices† 1.8 2.2 122 
13. Jiaxing 
 Population* 235.3 280.5 119 
 Rice prices† 1.9 2.1 110 
14. Jinhua 
 Population* 204.8 255.0 125 
 Rice prices† 1.5 2.4 160 
15. Ningbo 
 Population* 186.1 235.6 127 
 Rice prices† 1.7 2.2 129 
16. Quzhou 
 Population* 102.0 114.1 112 
 Rice prices† 1.6 2.1 131 
17. Shaoxing 
 Population* 426.5 539.2 126 
 Rice prices† 1.9 2.1 111 
18. Taizhou 
 Population* 222.7 277.4 125 
 Rice prices† 1.6 2.2 138 
19. Wenzhou 
 Population* 162.0 201.7 125 
 Rice prices† 1.4 1.7 121 
20. Yanzhou 
 Population* 127.4 146.1 115 
 Rice prices† 1.6 2.5 156 
 
 
Source: Population data are based on Ge, A Demographic History of China, Vol. 5, pp. 
87–8, 113. 
Note: * Population in 10,000 persons. † Silver taels per picul. 
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 Overall, most explanations thus far presented were based on rough back-of-the-
envelope style of calculations. The present research seeks to address this issue more 
comprehensively by employing a quantitative approach that allows for the independent 
and simultaneous effects of the identified factors to be estimated and analysed.  
 To conduct our analysis, we have developed an extensive dataset. The data are drawn 
from Qing sources. The key data of population, farmland, tax regimes and burden, 
government revenues and expenditures, food prices, China’s territorial borders, and 
disasters and disaster relief, are extracted from the following authoritative works: Zhao 
Erxun’s Qingshi Gao (Draft of the History of the Qing Dynasty), Liang Fangzhong’s 
Zhongguo Lidai Hukou Tiandi Tianfu Tongji (Dynastic Data for China’s Households, 
Cultivated Land and Land Taxation), Xiang Huaicheng’s Zhongguo Caizheng Tongshi (A 
General History of Government Finance in China), Peng Xinwei, Zhongguo Houbishi (A 
History of Currencies in China), H. S. Chuan and R. A. Kraus, Mid-Ch’ing Rice Markets 
and Trade: An Essay in Price History, Yeh-chien Wang’s ‘Secular Trends of Rice Prices 
in the Yangzi Delta, 1638–1935’, Yejian Wang’s The Database of Grain Prices in the 
Qing Dynasty, Zhongguo Houbishi (A History of Currencies in China), Tan Qixiang’s 
Jianming Zhongguo Lishi Dituji (Concise Maps of Chinese History), Chen Gaoyong’s 
Zhongguo Lidai Tianzai Renhuo Biao (Chronological Tables of Chinese Natural and 
Man-made Disasters), and Fu Zhongxia, Zhang Xing, Tian Zhaolin, and Yang Boshi’s 
Zhongguo Junshi Shi (A Military History of China). All of these works are based on 
confirmed government records and represent the best available data sources.  
 Information regarding silver as currency and its purchasing power comes from local 
accounts in the Lower Yangtze River: Ye Mengzhu’s Yueshi Bian (Record of Life-time 
Experience in Songjiang), Yao Tinglin’s Linian Ji (Personal Annals), and Department of 
Archives’ Li Xu Zouzhe (Li Xu’s Memorials to the Throne), H. S. Chuan and R. A. Kraus, 
Mid-Ch’ing Rice Markets and Trade: An Essay in Price History, Yeh-chien Wang’s 
‘Secular Trends of Rice Prices in the Yangzi Delta, 1638–1935’, Yejian Wang’s The 
Database of Grain Prices in the Qing Dynasty, Zhongguo Houbishi (A History of 
Currencies in China). 
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 Internal migration figures are based on Ge Jianxiong’s Zhongguo Yimin Shi (A History 
of Migration in China), a comprehensive five-volume study based heavily on local 
government records.  
 Information on the spread of maize-farming comes from detailed accounts of the 
adoption of the new crops as recorded in Qing local gazetteers (fangzhi), presented in 
Xian Jinshan’s ‘Cong Fangzhi Jizai Kan Yumi Zai Woguode Yinjin He Chuanbo’ 
(Adoption and Spread of Maize Seen from Local Gazetteers). The information contained 
in local gazetteers is commonly regarded as among the most reliable in premodern China.  
 Qing crop yield levels are based on Shi Zhihong’s ‘Shijiu Shiji Shangbanqide 
Zhongguo Liangshi Muchanliang Ji Zongchanliang Zai Guji’ (Re-Estimation of Yields 
per Mu and the Aggregate Food Output in Early Nineteenth Century China), a work that 
systematically tests all the main estimates hitherto. Shi’s analysis covers twelve southern 
provinces (Anhui, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Fujian, Guangdong, 
Guangxi, Sichuan, Guizhou, Yunnan). This is large enough to serve as a proxy for the 
improvement in the existing technology in food production.49 Shi’s yield range is similar 
to John Buck’s comprehensive survey of China’s food yields in the 1920s.50 We decide 
to use Shi’s information not only due to its economy-wide vision, but also because of its 
realistically modest approach compared with many regional ‘anecdotes-based’ or ‘best 
practice-based’ claims.  
 Due to the lack of data, goods for trade in the economy have to come from estimates. 
To strike a balance, we compared four major works, two in Chinese and two in English: 
(1) Wu Chengming’s Zhongguode Xiandaihua: Shichang Yu Shehui (China’s 
Modernization: Market and Society), (2) Liu Foding, Wang Yuru and Zhao Jin’s 
Zhongguo Jindai Jingji Fazhan Shi (A History of Economic Development in Early 
Modern China), (3) Chung-li Chang’s The Income of the Chinese Gentry, and (4) Albert 
Feuerwerker’s The Chinese Economy, 1870–1949. However, given that the market share 
of the Qing economy plays no part in our modelling, any inaccuracy in this respect has no 
bearing on our analysis. 
                                                 
49 Note: the average wheat yield level in eight provinces in North China (Zhili, Shandong, Shanxi, Henan, Shaanxi, 
Gansu, Manchuria, and Xinjiang) did not have much change and is thus unsuited for our purpose. 
50 Buck, Land Utilization in China: Atlas, pp. 4, 49. 
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 The complete list of data sources are presented in Table5. 
 
Table 5. Sources of Variables 
 
Variable Sources 
Population (LP) (Dependant) 
Qing official figures: Liang, Dynastic Data, p. 
10; Deng, ‘Unveiling China’s True Population 
Statistics’, Appendix 2. 
Farmland, mu (LLAND) (Predictor) 
Qing official figures: Liang, Dynastic Data, 
pp. 10, 380, 384, 396, 400, 401. 
Rice output (counting single crop), 
dou/mu (LOUTPUT) (Predictor) 
Crop yield levels (dou/mu): Shi Zhihong, ‘Re-
Estimation of Yields per Mu and the 
Aggregate Food Output in Early Nineteenth 
Century China’, pp. 52–66. 
Adoption of maize-farming 
(counting recipient counties) 
(LMAIZE) (Predictor) 
Xian, ‘Adoption and Spread of Maize Seen 
from Local Gazetteers’. 
Agricultural tax (Land-Poll and 
Stipend Rice) (LTAX) (Predictor) 
Qing official figures: Liang, Dynastic Data, 
pp. 10, 380, 384, 396, 400, 401, 414–16, 482; 
also Xiang, A General History of Government 
Finance, vol. 8, pp. 78, 222. 
Number of disasters and wars 
(LWARDI) (Control) 
Disasters: Chen, Chronological Tables of 
Chinese Natural and Man-Made Disasters. 
Wars: Fu et al., A Military History of China, 
pp. 65–85.  
Disaster relief (counting recipient 
counties) (LRELIEF) (Control) 
Qing official records: Zhao, History of the 
Qing Dynasty, vols 4–25 ‘Benji’ (Biographies 
of the Qing Emperors), in Twenty-Five 
Official Histories, vol. 11, pp. 8827–8937. 
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Prices of rice, taels/shi 
(LPRICE) (Control) 
Official figures: Wang, ‘Secular Trends of 
Rice Prices in the Yangzi Delta, 1638–1935’; 
Wang, The Database of Grain Prices in the 
Qing Dynasty; Peng, A History of Currencies 
in China, pp. 824–5, 837, 844, 850–1. 
Silver’s purchasing power index 
(LINDEX) (Control) 
Period information: Ye, Record of Life-time 
Experience in Songjiang; Yao, Personal 
Annals; Department of Archives, Palace Museum 
(ed.), Li Xu’s Memorials to the Throne); 
Wang, Database of Grain. 
 
 
II. Hypothesis and Modelling  
 
 Our hypothesis is that the sustained population growth during the Qing period was the 
result of a range of factors: (i) farmland availability, the main resource base of the 
economy, (ii) crop yield level, which determined the food stock for the population to live 
on, (iii) maize adoption and adaptation, which serves as a proxy for new farming 
technology, and (iv) direct taxes imposed on land and population, a financial burden 
which deducted wealth from the population. Hence, our dependent variable is the growth 
in population (P), with our four predictor variable being farmland availability (LAND), 
crop yield (OUTPUT), maize adoption and adaptation (MAIZE), and agricultural taxes 
(TAX). 
 Moreover, we include four control variables within our estimation model. The first 
control is the combined number of wars and natural disasters to account for shocks on the 
standing population. The second control is the number of counties receiving government 
disaster-relief designed to assist the standing population. The third control is the price of 
rice (the primary staple food), which intends to indicate cost of living. Our fourth control 
is the purchasing power index of silver, to provide a robust check on food prices. In the 
model these four controls are given as WARDI, RELIEF, PRICE, and INDEX, 
respectively.  
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 Our population figures are numbers of persons counted by the state. While the accuracy 
of the official data has been questioned,51 there has been no independent information to 
verify either the official data or the modern doubts. In terms of farmland, the practice of 
land acreage conversion (zhe mu) is well understood, a system under which all farmland 
was commonly converted into a bench-mark mu for taxation purposes.52 Note that the mu 
figures cited in Qing official documents only make sense if one imagines that all the Qing 
farmland had the identical medium fertility. Figures after conversion still reflected the 
size of the Qing resource basis for food production.  
 Regarding the burden of direct taxes, we incorporate two types of agricultural taxes: (1) 
the main type of Land-Poll Tax (diding) collected in silver from all 18 provinces, and (2) 
the auxiliary Stipend Rice Tax (cao mi, cao liang) collected in grain from 8 provinces 
along the Grand Canal and other rivers.53 Both were direct taxes and claimed the lion’s 
share of the Qing government’s revenue. Given that the cash for the Land-Poll Tax 
payment was in one way or another a result of peasant grain sales at market for the sake 
of tax payment, both taxes came as grain, either originally or ultimately, from the farming 
sector. Thus, we convert all the monetary tax payments to grain (shi) according to the 
current prices. Our tax burden is measured by tax revenue per mu of farmland to make it 
more agriculture-specific. 
 Now, there is a paradox regarding tax payment in food. On the one hand, such taxes 
constituted a deduction of households’ income which would have otherwise been used to 
support more children in the faming sector. On the other hand, food surrendered by the 
peasantry to the state may not have all been wasted. Rather, it could be consumed by 
                                                 
51 E.g. G. W. Skinner, ‘Sichuan’s Population in the Nineteenth Century’, Late Imperial China, 8/1 (1987), pp. 1–79. 
Noted, Sichuan during the Qing was one of the 18 provinces. It remains unclear the extent of the problem.  
52 Liang, Dynastic Data, p. 528, and Zhao Yun, ‘Jishu Wucha, Zhemu Jiqi Juli Shuaijian Guilü Yanjiu’ (Technical 
Errors: Land Unit Conversion and the Law of Diminishing Distance), Zhongguo Shehui Jingjishi Yanjiu (Research into 
Chinese Social and Economic History), 3 (2007), pp. 1–13; Shi Zhihong, ‘Shijiu Shiji Shangbanqide Zhongguo 
Liangshi Muchanliang Jiqi Zongchanliang Zai Guji’ (Re-Estimation of Yields per Mu and the Aggregate Food Output 
in Early Nineteenth Century China), Zhongguo Jingjishi Yanjiu (Research into Chinese Economic History) 3 (2012), p. 
55. 
53 Zai Ling, Caoyun Quanshu (Complete Records of Stipend Rice Shipping) (N.d. Reprint. Beijing: Beijing Library 
Press, no date); Li Wenzhi and Jiang Taixin, Qingdai Caoyun (Stipend Rice during the Qing Period) (Beijing: 
Zhonghua Books, 1995). 
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someone else in the economy, be they officials, soldiers and artisans. Non-farming 
families would have babies, too. Therefore, in theory, taxes merely redistributed food 
instead of destroying it. In reality, however, food was perishable and there was regular 
spoilage in relation to transport and storage, not to mention food used in state-run alcohol 
production and for state-own herds of working animals.  
 In addition, tax regimes affected farmers’ future production perspectives and incentives 
if they saw a cash cower in cash cropping and handicrafts. It channeled resources to non-
food production, and reduced food for potentially more population growth. So, even if the 
cash for tax payment did not come from food farming through conversion, it represented 
opportunity costs for the food stock that would otherwise be produced. 
 Aside from land taxes, a few minor taxes such as the Salt Tax (yanke) and Customs 
Duties (guanshui) were imposed. But these were indirect taxes and hence linked to 
consumers’ choices, and as such, less stable. There was also the notorious ‘Transit Levy’ 
(lijin or likin). But this new tax began very late in the 1850s, and is therefore unsuited for 
our analysis.  
 Based upon the sources listed in Table 5, our time series dataset covers the period 1646 
to 1911 with 77 observations. Due to data availability, there are inevitable gaps in our 
time series. That said, most of our data are relatively evenly spread out across the time 
period under consideration. Where applicable, missing data are linearly interpolated, no 
estimation is used. Table 6 summarises the descriptive statistics of the variables without 
conversion to natural logarithm. 
 
Table 6. Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
Variables Mean S.D. Min Max Obs. Period 
Population (P) 237000000  146000000  38600000  399000000  118 1655-1911 
Farmland, mu  
(LAND) 727000000  106000000  388000000  912000000  104 1655-1877 
Rice output, 
dou/mu   
(OUTPUT) 313.008 7.515 306 321 122 1646-1911 
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Adoption of 
maize-farming 
(counties) 
(MAIZE) 709.287 691.037 113 1944 122 1646-1911 
Disasters and 
wars (WARDI) 13.672 8.102 2 56 122 1646-1911 
Disaster relief 
(counties) 
(RELIEF) 592 454.675 0 1929 90 1646-1911 
Rice Prices 
taels/shi (PRICE) 1.919 0.906 0.6 6.2 121 1646-1911 
Silver’s 
purchasing power 
index  (INDEX) 126.486 67.384 37 392.2 112 1646-1911 
Agricultural  
direct taxes, shi of 
grain (TAX) 0.034 0.016 0.01 0.099 102 1661-1906 
Source: See Table 5. 
 
III. Estimation Strategy and Empirical Results 
 
 As a first step, we conduct an analysis of correlation coefficients of the logged values 
of our dependent, four explanatory, and four control variables. Doing so suggests 
potentially high levels of collinearity between LLAND, LTAX, and LPRICE: i.e. the 
correlation coefficients between LLAND and LTAX, between LTAX and LPRICE, 
between LLAND and LPRICE are -0.7318, -0.9380 and 0.4861, respectively. This is well 
expected, considering (1) the deliberate policy of the Qing state of ‘embedding the Poll 
Tax in farmland’ (tanding rumu) and (2) the conversion of tax revenue in silver to tax 
revenue in kind (grain). As a result, we choose not to include LTAX within the 
subsequent multivariate analysis. 
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 The next step in our analysis is to examine the determinants of Qing population growth 
by employing Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). Our model in the log-linear version is 
structured as follows (Model 1): 
 
LPt = α + β1LLANDt + β2LOUTPUTt + β3LMAIZEt + β4LWARDIt+ β5LRELIEFt+ 
β6LPRICEt + error       (1)  
 
It is expected that farmland (LLANDt), rice output (LOUTPUTt), adoption of maize-
farming (LMAIZEt) and disaster relief (LRELIEFt) are positively related to population 
growth (LPt); and disasters and wars (LWARDIt) to be negatively related to population 
growth, ceteris paribus. Note that while there exists a strong positive theoretical 
relationship between standard of living and population growth, the expected direction of 
LPRICEt is nonetheless indeterminate due to the complexity of the relationship between 
rice prices and Qing period living standards, as will be discussed in further detail below. 
 Our methodology is to run multiple versions of the model, adding each of the 
explanatory and control variables with each iteration run, in order to obtain a complete 
set of regression results. The results are displayed in Table 7. 
 
Table 7. OLS Empirical Results with Standard Error 
 
 Model iteration 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Farmland 
(LLANDt) 
1.958 1.053 0.924 0.926 0.910  
(0.284)*** (0.311)*** (0.305)*** (0.327)*** (0.314)*** 
Rice output     
(LOUTPUTt) 
23.024 13.411 13.583 15.758 14.602  
(1.912)*** (2.553)*** (2.477)*** (2.883)*** (2.792)*** 
Adoption of 
maize-
farming 
(LMAIZEt) 
 0.398 0.382 0.306 0.235  
 (0.078)*** (0.076)*** (0.090)*** (0.090)** 
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Disasters and 
wars 
(LWARDIt) 
  -0.184 -0.217 -0.226  
  (0.068)*** (0.077)*** (0.074)*** 
Disaster 
relief 
(LRELIEFt) 
   0.133 0.100  
   (0.040)*** (0.040)** 
Prices of rice 
(LPRICEt) 
    0.327  
    (0.120)*** 
Obs 104 104 104 77 77  
Adj R-sq 0.796 0.836 0.846 0.858 0.870  
Note: 1. The dependent variable for all iterations is Population (LP). 2. Standard errors 
are in parentheses. 3.∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ are coefficients significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
  
 The generated results are for the most part consistent with our prior expectations. In 
particular, all of the estimated coefficients for all of the included variables in each of the 
model iterations are significant at the 95 percent significance level or higher.  Importantly, 
the model itself seems stable, with the scales of the coefficients remain relatively 
consistent as additional variables are successively included. Likewise, the signs on the 
coefficients are all in line with our a priori expectations.  
 The one exception is in regard to the sign of the coefficient on rice prices (LPRICEt). 
Earlier, we suggested that the expected direction of this variable was ambiguous; here, 
we explain our reasoning in greater detail. Our results find a positive relationship 
between rice prices and population growth. In some sense, this might be regarded as 
counter-intuitive — intuitively, a high price of food implies a high cost of living, and a 
high cost of living discourages population growth, suggesting an expected negative 
relationship between rice prices and population growth. Correctly interpreting this 
situation however requires a deeper understanding of the dualistic nature of the Chinese 
economy, and the equally dualistic nature of China’s food markets under the Qing. There 
are four main components of this analysis. Firstly, although some studies have implicitly 
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linked Qing commercial growth to population growth,54 Qing China was not known for 
an unusual growth in trade and capitalism. Throughout most of the Qing era, the share of 
trade as a percentage of GDP remained small, as did the share of food, up until the eve of 
the 1840 Opium War (Table 8). It has been estimated that only 5.5 percent of the grain 
produced during this period ever entered intra-regional trade. 55  This made the Qing 
period very different from the Song period, when population growth was fuelled by an 
unprecedented degree of commercialisation and proto-industrialisation.56 
 
Table 8. China’s Annual Trade in Value, 1830s 
 
   Value, in tonnes of silver % in total 
1. Rural sector 
  Grain57 6,123.8  41.0 
 Cotton fibre and cotton cloth 4027.5 27.0 
 Tea  1,196.3  8.0 
  Raw silk and silk textiles 997.5  6.7 
2. Urban sector 
  Salt  2,197.5 14.7 
  Porcelain 168.8  1.1 
  Metals  225.0 1.5 
Total  14,936.3  100.0 
3. Trade in GDP 
                                                 
54 Li Bozhong, Duoshijiao Kan Jiangnan Jingjishi, 1250–1850 (Multiple Dimensional View on Economic History of 
the Jiangnan Region, 1250–1850) (Beijing: Sanlian Books, 2003); Li Bozhong and J. L. van Zanden, ‘Before the Great 
Divergence? Comparing the Yangzi Delta at the Beginning of the Nineteenth Century’, Journal of Economic History 
72 (2012), pp. 956–90. 
55 Wu, Quantitative Studies of Chinese Economic History, pp. 374, 376 
56  K. Deng and L. Zheng, ‘Economic Restructuring and Demographic Growth, Demystifying Growth and 
Development in Northern Song China, 960–1127’, Economic History Review, (2015), forthcoming. 
57 The figures for grain represent some of the more optimistic estimates; see Yeh-chien Wang, ‘Evolution of the 
Chinese Monetary System, 1644–1850’, in Hou Chi-ming, ed., Modern Chinese Economic History (Taipei: The 
Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, 1979), pp. 425–56. 
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China’s total GDP 104,298.8–131,568.8 
Trade in total GDP  11.4–14.3 
Of which grain in total GDP  4.7–5.9 
 
Source: Market values, based on Wu Cengming, Zhongguode Xiandaihua: Shichang Yu 
Shehui (China’s Modernization: Market and Society) (Beijing: Sanlian Books, 2001), pp. 
148–9. China’s total GDP, based on Chung-li Chang, The Income of the Chinese Gentry 
(Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1962), p. 296; Albert Feuerwerker, The 
Chinese Economy, 1870–1949 (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies of the University 
of Michigan, 1995), p. 16; Liu Foding, Wang Yuru and Zhao Jin, Zhongguo Jindai Jingji 
Fazhan Shi (A History of Economic Development in Early Modern China) (Beijing: 
Tertiary Education Press, 1999), p. 66. 
Note: Values reflect current prices. 
 
 Secondly, the vast majority of cited rice prices were urban ones. Rural and village 
prices have remained largely unknown. Moreover, to treat the Qing economy as an 
integrated market can be misleading. The Qing urban markets were not highly integrated 
even in the advanced Lower Yangtze Delta during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
let alone cross-regional markets (Figures 14 and 15).58 
 
Figure 14. Urban Prices of Rice per Picul (Shi) in Jiangsu Province, 1740–1910  
                                                 
58 For similar plural markets for food during the Qing, see Luo Chang, ‘Liangtao Qingdai Liangjia Shuju Ziliaode 
Bijiao Yu Shiyong’ (Comparison and Application of Two Sets of Food Price Data for the Qing Period), Jindaishi 
Yanjiu (Study of Modern History), 5 (2012), pp. 142–56. 
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Modern History, Academia Sinica, 2013, http://140.109.152.38/DBIntro.asp. 
Note: Prices of the Ninth Month, in silver tael. Rice in picul (shi). Locations are seats of 
governments of named prefectures. 
 
Figure 15. Urban Prices of Rice per Picul (Shi) in Zhejiang Province, 1740–1910  
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Note: the same as Figure 14. 
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  Thirdly, on the demand side, the amount of market-dependent food consumers, mainly 
the urban dwellers, accounted for only about 6–7 percent of the total population.59 Even 
in the economically-advanced Jiangsu and Zhenjiang Provinces of the Lower Yangtze, 
urbanisation rates were only at 13.6 percent and 10 percent, respectively (circa 1790).60 
Note these figures include urban absentee landlords who received their rent in the form of 
either cash payment or food. By the end of the Qing, throughout 16 provinces, landlords 
accounted for just two percent all households.61 Thus, even if all landlords had been 
absentees, their impact on the urban food market would be trivial. 
 Within the urban sector, there were state-run annual stipends of four million piculs (shi) 
of rice (300,000 tonnes) for all officials and military personnel. This stipend rice was 
extracted from eight provinces as a tax in kind. At the aforementioned minimal food 
consumption level, this four million piculs was estimated to be able to feed 1.7 million 
adults, sufficient for both 800,000 Qing military troops, and 24,150 (c. 1700) to 26,355 
(1850) salaried Qing officials.62 These urban consumers therefore did not depend on the 
staple food market for their per diem. Hence, the Qing urban market was smaller than the 
urban population figures might suggest.  
 Additionally, there was the food exported to the four food-deficient provinces to feed 
15–24 million adults. Given that the total population in Shandong, Jiangnan, Fujian and 
Guangdong was about 91.7 million (as of 1776), the beneficiaries counted merely for 
one-sixth to a quarter of the locals, let alone in China’s total.  
 Thus, on the demand side, it was non-military and non-government official urban 
dwellers, and import-dependent communities in the coastal food-deficit provinces, who 
were the primary users of the food markets. These consumers were likely to be price-
takers on the grounds that (a) they were unable to alter the supply of food and, (b) food 
                                                 
59 Ge, A Demographic History of China, Vol. 5, pp. 774, 828–9. 
60 Ibid., pp. 757, 762. 
61 Fairbank, Cambridge History of China, vol. 12, p. 84. 
62 The total number of the Qing troops included 120,000 Eight Banners (baqi) and 660,000 Green Standards (lüying, 
literarily ‘Green Corps’); see Zhao, History of the Qing Dynasty, vol. 131, ‘Military’, in Twenty-Five Official Histories, 
vol. 11, pp. 9305, 9307. For the number of salaried officials, see Yang Zhimei, Xhongguo Gudai Guanzhi Jiangzuo 
(Bureaucracy of Premodern China) (Beijing: Zhonghua Books, 1992), pp. 420–1. According to Chung-li Chang’s, the 
officials were at one time only 12,000 and no more than 22,830; see Chang, Income, pp. 42, 197, 329–30. 
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consumption is both relatively price and income inelastic. On the supply side, marketed 
food was only about 4.7–5.9 of China’s total GDP (Table 8). This implies that the vast 
majority of the Qing population did not live on marketed food. Conceptually, we call the 
functional food market (the source for our rice prices) the ‘urban real food market’. 
 Fourthly, although the lion’s share of food in the economy did not enter the market, 
due to the taxation linkage, farmers were aware of food prices in the market sector as a 
reliable reference to real tax burden. Inevitably, urban real food market prices had real 
meaning for the rural population, even in the absence of substantial physical trading of 
rice. Conceptually, the rural non-market sector can be referred to as a ‘rural virtue food 
market’. Because of the legally required cash payment for the Land-Poll, a rise in urban 
rice prices is equivalent to a tax cut. The non-market sector is also made better off due to 
a virtue gain in farmers’ food value. Such a mechanism affected over 90 percent of the 
Qing population.  
 Thus, the key mechanism between rice prices, standard of living, and population 
growth is illuminated. The relationship between living standards and population growth is 
clear — lower living standards puts downward pressure on population growth, while 
higher living standards supports population growth. But the dualistic nature of Qing 
China's rice markets meant that increases in food prices saw rural living standards rise 
(leading to an increase in births in the non-market sector), while urban living standards 
fell  (leading to birth declines in the market sector). Given the highly unequal population 
distribution between urban and rural China under the Qing, the net effect of a rise in rice 
prices was an increase in the aggregate population.  
 This process is expressed in Figure 16. Note that the economy is divided into the 
market and non-market sectors. The initial move comes from an increase in food demand 
in the market sector (including all the people who depend the market for food) with a 
shift from D to D'. The resultant food price increase from P1 to P2 subsequently attracts 
more food to the market (Q1 to Q2). The increase in the food price likewise increases 
costs of living in the market sector (C1 to C2) which in turn discourages births (B1 to B2). 
At the same time, an increase in the market food price has an income effect, making non-
market (mainly rural) households’ existing food stock more valuable than before (Y1 to 
Y2), with the initial income gain represented by the area Y1 Y2 δ γ. With the Qing direct 
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tax revenue (the Land-Poll Tax) being frozen at 0 Y0 λ Q'1, there is also a tax saving. 
Given the increase value in food, the new tax obligation accounts for a smaller share in 
the gross households’ income as follows:  
 
 II + III (0 Y2 δ Q'1) > II (0 Y1 γ Q'1);   
 Hence, I (0 Y0 λ Q'1) : II + III  <  I : II.  
 
Figure 15. Dual Sectors of the Qing Economy 
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Note: Points a, b, γ, δ, λ are equilibria. The solid arrow represents the initial move of the 
market demand curve, the hollow arrow represents a subsequent change in market food 
prices, the dash arrow represents ‘income effect of changed food prices’ in the non-
market sector, thick dash lines represent key linkages between the two sectors, and the 
thick line represents a reduction in income from direct taxes. Areas I, II, and III represent 
different components of households’ gross income. 
 
 Rural households’ net wealth moves from W0-W1 to W0-W2, a condition which 
encourages births (P1 to P2), as shown in Figure 16. 
 
Figure 16. Impact on the Non-Market Sector 
 
 
 
Note: Points a, b, γ, δ, λ are equilibria. 0-Y0 and 0-W0 show income deduction due to 
taxes. The hollow arrow represents a subsequent change in market food prices, and the 
dash arrow represents ‘income effect of changed food prices’ in the non-market sector, 
Areas I, II, and III represent different components of households’ gross income. 
 
 Our quantitative analysis indicates the existence of a time lag between a rise in food 
price, and a subsequent increase in population (Columns 13 and 14 in Table 10). Our 
discovery unveils the complexity of the Qing economy. By correctly identifying in our 
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analysis that two sectors, two markets, and two human reproduction regimes must be 
decoupled from one another, the appropriate logic behind the positive relationship 
between urban rice prices and overall population growth is illuminated. 
 We subjected our output to White’s Test, which confirmed the presence of 
heteroskedasticity.63 Therefore, we conduct several robustness checks, performing OLS 
using robust standard errors. First, we re-run Model 1 utilizing robust standard error. 
Second, we create a new variant of the model, labeled Model 2, in which we substitute 
silver’s purchasing power index (LINDEXt) for the variable representing rice prices 
(LPRICEt): 
 
LPt = α + β1LLANDt + β2LOUTPUTt + β3LMAIZEt + β4LWARDIt + β5LRELIEFt + 
β6LINDEXt  +  error       (2) 
 
 Finally, we construct Model 3, in which we include agricultural direct taxes (LTAXt) but 
drop farmland (LLANDt) and rice prices (LPRICEt) in order to reveal the impact of 
LTAXt on population (LPt):  
 
LPt = α + β1 LOUTPUTt + β2LMAIZEt + β3LWARDIt  + β4LRELIEFt  + β5LTAXt + 
error       (3) 
 
 The results of our robustness checks are displayed in Table 9, with Columns (6), (7)  
and (8) displaying  the regression results of Models 1, 2 and 3, respectively. 
 
Table 9. OLS Empirical Results with Robust Standard Error 
 Population 
  (6) (7) (8) 
Farmland (LLANDt) 0.910  0.676    
                                                 
63 Due to the nature of our finite and non-contiguous data with irregular gaps in the time series, we are unable to carry 
out tests for autocorrelation, or an HAC (Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Standard Error) and 
cointegration analysis. 
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(0.340)*** (0.364)*  
Rice output (LOUTPUTt) 
14.602  13.699  14.449 
(2.873)*** ( 2.791)*** (2.779)*** 
Adoption of maize (LMAIZEt) 
0.235  0.173  0.259 
(0.060)*** (0.067)** (0.068)*** 
Disasters and wars (LWARDIt) 
-0.226  -0.216  -0.265 
(0.086)** (0.086)** (0.091)*** 
Disaster relief (LRELIEFt) 
0.100  0.097  0.131 
(0.034)*** (0.032)*** (0.032)*** 
Prices of rice (LPRICEt) 
0.327    
(0.110)***   
Silver’s purchasing power index (LINDEXt) 
 -0.498   
 (0.134)***  
Total direct taxes (LTAXt) 
  -0.431 
  (0.119)*** 
Obs 77  71  75  
Adj R-sq 0.880  0.875  0.868 
 
Note: 1. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 2. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ are coefficients 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 The high values of adjusted R-squared indicate that our three model formulations are 
well-specified, with the independent variables able to capture most of the variation in the 
dependent variable. Note that for Model 1, the results from OLS using robust standard 
error are not different from those presented in Table 7. For the Model 2 and 3 
specifications, we find that LINDEXt and LTAXt are negatively related to LPt. Their 
coefficients are significant at 1% level.  
 Note that while, like LPRICEt, LINDEXt is measured in the silver currency (taels), we 
must be careful in its interpretation. LPRICEt represents market prices, which are 
positively related to population growth; the coefficients on LPRICE in our regression 
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results in all model specifications are positive, as expected. Conversely, for LINDEXt , 
the purchasing power of silver is negatively related to the population growth, since the 
stronger the currency’s purchasing power, the lower the general price level, which lowers 
the cost of living. This contrasts with higher food prices, which translate into higher 
living costs. Thus, with respect to the cost of living, market prices and silver's purchasing 
power move in opposite directions. 
 Given that there exists the possibility that causation could also run from the dependent 
variable to the independent variables, we run additional variants of the Models with 
lagged values of the independent variables of farmland (LLANDt-1), rice output 
(LOUTPUTt-1), adoption of maize (LMAIZEt-1), disaster relief (LRELIEFt-1), prices of 
rice (LPRICEt-1), as well as silver’s purchasing power index (LINDEXt-1) in Model 2, 
and agricultural direct taxes (LTAXt-1) in Model 3. Since wars and disasters usually had 
their impact on population in real time, we do not include a variable for lagged values of 
LWARDI. 
 We repeat our methodology as before with Model 1, successively adding lagged 
versions of the independent variables one at a time; these results are shown in Columns 
(9)–(14) in Table 10. Column (15) in Table 10 indicates the results of using the lagged 
variable LINDEX t-1in Model 2. Similarly, the results with lagged variables in Model 3 are 
shown in Table 11. 
 
Table 10. OLS Empirical Results of Model 2 with Lagged Variables and Robust Standard 
Error 
 Population 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) 
LLAND 
 0.874  0.877  0.865  1.003    
 (0.349)** (0.353)** (0.323)*** (0.332)***  
LLANDt-1 
0.565      0.943  0.783  
(0.271)**     (0.297)*** (0.368)** 
LOUTPUT 
14.526   14.732  13.414  14.436    
(2.729)***  (2.752)*** (2.860)*** (2.879)***  
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LOUTPUT t-1 
 13.776     12.716  11.745  
 (2.951)***   (2.992)*** (2.889)*** 
LMAIZE 
0.232  0.275   0.240  0.237    
(0.059)*** (0.068)*** (0.063)*** (0.061)***  
LMAIZEt-1 
  0.243    0.257  0.193  
  (0.059)***  (0.064)*** (0.068)*** 
LWARDI 
-0.233  -0.224  -0.217  -0.234  -0.200  -0.162  -0.152  
(0 .086)*** (0.088)** (0.085)** (0.077)*** (0.083)** (0.077)** (0.078)* 
LRELIEF 
0.102  0.113  0.104   0.097    
(0.032)*** (0.038)*** (0.034)*** (0.033)***  
LRELIEF t-1 
   0.098   0.090  0.083  
   (0.034)*** (0.037)** (0.036)** 
LPRICE 
0.415  0.278  0.330  0.318     
(0.110)*** (0.122)** (0.109)*** (0.103)***   
LPRICEt-1 
    0.332  0.322   
    (0.102)*** (0.105)***  
LINDEXt-1 
      -0.503  
      (0.126)*** 
Obs 76 77 77 77 77 77 71 
Adj R-sq 0.884 0.874 0.881 0.883 0.882 0.872 0.868 
 
Note: 1. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 2. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ are coefficients 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
Table 11. OLS Empirical Results of Model 3 with Lagged Variables and Robust Standard 
Error 
 Population 
  (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
LOUTPUT 
 14.361  12.898  14.261   
 (2.683)*** (2.839)*** (2.766)*** 
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LOUTPUTt-1 
13.770     12.342  
(2.844)***   (2.980)*** 
LMAIZE 
0.303   0.299  0.253   
(0.074)*** (0.075)*** (0.076)*** 
LMAIZEt-1 
 0.273    0.329  
 (0.067)***  (0.075)*** 
LWARDI 
-0.258  -0.250  -0.254  -0.229  -0.174  
(0.093)*** (0.090)*** (0.080)*** (0.088)** (0.084)** 
LRELIEF 
0.143  0.135   0.122   
(0.034)*** (0.031)*** (0.030)*** 
LRELIEFt-1 
  0.120   0.118  
  (0.032)*** (0.035)*** 
LTAX 
-0.361  -0.430  -0.358    
(0.138)** (0.109)*** (0.121)***  
LTAXt-1 
   -0.473  -0.345  
   (0.131)*** (0.139)** 
Obs 75 75 76 74 75  
Adj R-sq 0.862 0.871 0.868 0.868 0.851  
 
Note: 1. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses. 2. ∗∗∗, ∗∗ and ∗ are coefficients 
significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 We can observe that the results of running our model specifications 1, 2 and 3 with 
lagged variables generate results that are highly similar to our model specifications 
without lagged variables. This indicates there is a low risk of bi-directional causality in 
our model specifications between the dependent and independent variables. Therefore, 
we focus our remaining discussion in regard to the results listed in Table 7. 
 The empirical results generated from Models 1, 2 and 3 (listed in Table 7) indicate that 
all eight predictor variables (Table 6) were important for the population growth (LP) 
experienced under the Qing. Farmland (LLANDt), rice output (LOUTPUTt), adoption of 
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maize-farming (LMAIZEt) and disaster relief (LRELIEFt) all had positive and significant 
impact on population growth.  
 Given the size of the coefficient, the effect of rice output on population growth was 
substantial. Second in importance was the amount of farmland, followed by the impact of 
rice prices, adoption of maize-farming, and then disaster relief. This result reveals that 
improvements in the then-existing technology (an increased rice yield level) and 
availability of new technology (adoption of maize) were the main driving forces behind 
Qing population growth. In this context, a significant amount of ‘free lunches’ still 
existed in the Qing economy.64  
 On the institutional front, the Qing proto-welfare state that expanded farmland 
(migration embedded) and minimised population losses played a positive role in 
population growth.65 
 In addition, wars and disasters (LWARDI) had a significant but negative influence on 
population growth, as did direct taxes (LTAX). The negative impact of the tax burden 
was greater than that of wars and disasters, despite the fact that the Qing tax burden was 
the lightest hitherto in China's history, and perhaps because disaster relief buffered 
shocks from calamities.  
 It is worth noting that both farmland (LLAND) and agricultural direct taxes (LTAX) 
had impact on the Qing population growth. However, during the Qing, there was a 
capping of agricultural direct taxes. As such, the positive impact of the expansion of 
farmland on the population stood out more prominently. On the other hand, in per unit of 
farmland terms, agricultural direct taxes became progressively lighter as the tax revenue 
was diluted in the increasing farmland. So, the impact of the tax burden per mu was 
negative but weak on population growth. 
 Finally, in terms of cost of living, the prices of rice (LPRICE) had positive and 
significant impact while the silver’s purchasing power index (LINDEX) had negative and 
significant impact on population growth.  
 
                                                 
64 Joel Mokyr, The Lever of Riches (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), ch. 1. 
65 Will, Bureaucracy and Famine; Will and Wong, Nourish the People; Deng, The Premodern Chinese Economy, chs 
1–3. 
 47 
IV. Conclusions 
 
In this study, we used a historical time series dataset to model China’s unprecedented 
population expansion during the Qing Period. Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with robust 
standard errors, as well as more dynamic models with lagged variables, were used to 
model the impact on population growth from a variety of explanatory variables. Our 
results prove to be robust, and the lagged variable tests indicate a low risk of bi-
directional causality. 
 Our findings reveal that the extraordinary growth in China’s population during the 
Qing Period was supported by, in the order of weight and importance, a synergy of (1) 
farming technology (rice yield and maize adoption), (2) farmland, and (3) disaster relief. 
These three factors are all positively related to population growth. Wars and disasters, 
and the degree of tax burden had a negative impact on Qing population growth. Further, 
the unique combination of increased farmland and capped agricultural direct taxes led to 
a steady decline in the tax burden on per unit of land, which in turn reduced the negative 
impact of taxation on population growth. It is clear that to a very large extent, the 
extraordinary population growth experienced in China under the Qing was mainly 
propelled by the non-market sector, which responded to changes in food prices very 
differently from its market counterpart.  
 Admittedly, out research is on the macro-level using an economy-wide approach, 
which makes sense only when we deal with the Qing economy as one entity. It would be 
ideal to have more available variables on both macro- and micro-levels to facilitate more 
empirical studies of the premodern economy of China. 
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